Comodo browser fiasco

comodo browser fiasco

Comodo should release the full certificates to the internet as well as all of the details relating to the attack. Mozilla and other browsers. The hack has also been claimed by the so-called Comodohacker, allegedly a year-old Iranian student, who also claimed to have hacked four other. by Phillip Hallam-Baker (Comodo Group). Empowering Individuals with Tools to Manage Their Personal Data for the Identity in the Browser. DEWALT FOLDING WORKBENCH HOME DEPOT Приобрести Подробнее 815,00. Веб магазин косметики, 066 78-30-263 063 304-35-75 Товаров в Добро пожаловать в сумму: 00,00 грн. Бесплатная доставка от тестера косметики, пробники работы Интернет-магазин работает корзине: 0 На интернет магазин косметики.

On the plus side, if you do use. Submit a Link ». Try Ads-Free Fark. Forgot password? Turn on javascript or enable it for Fark for a better user experience. If you can read this, either the style sheet didn't load or you have an older browser that doesn't support style sheets.

Try clearing your browser cache and refreshing the page. View Voting Results: Smartest and Funniest. If reputable businesses are still dealing with Comodo after the last fiasco, they need a serious slap upside the head. How does one become a global certificate authority?

I'm assuming an art test is involved at this point:. It's like Orwell's doublespeak. The assholes just co-opt "security" and "privacy" apps to deliver their own malware and adware crap. Whoops, read that as SuperFisting. On the plus side, if you do use self signed certificates, anyone with PrivDog installed will be able to access your site with no certificate warnings.

The actual headline in TFA sounds like something that would be illegal to sell in Alabama. With all the news of the last two weeks concerning Spyware, I'm half convinced that we'll see the head of the NSA go on a TV tour to whine that if it weren't for those meddling kids, he'd gone away with it!

Just as he did when Apple and Google started offering encryption with their OSes. What we need to do is consistently misspell their name as "Commodo". Make a meme until they have to change their brand. At least they aren't Trustwave who issued a subordinate root certificate to a third party so they could MitM anyone without any certificate warnings.

The Reg is infamous for their inscrutable headlines. Ah, I was wrong, gmail. It was: mail. IE is a blocked application. ICMP blocked globally. Craw Fu. FYI - I don't recommend googling 'superfisting'. Oh that's perfectly OK then. Wait a second! That's precisely the sort of thing that SSL is meant to protect you from in the first place! I would suggest the better way of "locking down" Comodo products currently is to totally wipe your system and never install them again.

On the plus side, if you do use it uses self signed certificates, anyone with PrivDog installed will be able to access your some malicious 'man-in-middle proxy site with no certificate warnings. This thread is archived, and closed to new comments. That's not covered by the insurance, I'm pretty sure. In a perfect world people who invest their time in detecting and reporting security holes which affect the entire world, people who helped reporters from Egypt and Libya to bypass censorship should deserve a medal.

The Torbutton extension for Firefox is one of the most frequently downloaded extensions on that site, 4,, downloads to date and , daily users on March 23rd. Torbutton bundles Tor, Polipo, and Vidalia. It advertises itself as "currently the only addon that will safely manage your Tor browsing to prevent IP address leakage, cookie leakage, and general privacy attacks", thus giving the user a reasonable expectation of privacy.

Since then there have been many bugfixes to Tor, including fixes to serious security-relevant issues. When will these bugfixes find their way into Torbutton? By not updating Torbutton, you are putting millions of users of the extension at risk. Some of them may be dissidents in brutal dictatorships and the consequences to them of being found out are dire. You seem to misunderstand what Torbutton does.

It only handles the Firefox side of things and has nothing to do with Tor core. Aside from Firefox 4 compatibility and a couple addon conflicts, not much new in the way of security updates for Torbutton has been needed. The 'global trustee' cert sounds to me like it could be a signing certificate rather than simply a normal normal site certificate. If so then the attacker could sign further certs of their own. Even worse is that OCSP is generally only applied to the leaf of trust, meaning that even if OCSP worked properly it wouldn't help should this be true.

Are they posting patches? Do they automatically check CRLs? Now, assuming they are coded to hard fail. Opera seems to be maintaining a separate server of their own with certificates etc. Need to dig this deeper, but it seems to evade the whole CA down thing assuming Opera will try to ensure that those servers are up. Anyone gone through source to see why that is? Not an issue, just curious. What makes you guys think that solving for the CA's private key from the public key is all that hard.

Have you looked into how much or how little computation power is need these days to do this? It certainly is within the capability of large corporations and even small countries. The whole https security thing is bogus anyway unless the domain name server system can be secured.

Most companies are better off using their own self created certificates and changing them frequently like weekly or daily. The browser preapproved CA list just encourages forgery. It depends on the private key in question - do you know of any keys smaller than bits in major browsers? There is no proof that finding the private key from the public key is a 'hard' or 'large' problem in the mathematical algorithmic sense - only that most people don't know how to do it efficiently.

In any event it is certainly no 'bigger' than the factoring problem factoring the product of two large primes in which there has been alot of progress algoritmically. Practically, in light of modern processors, say clusters of GPUs, backsolving private keys is almost personally affordable. Comodo has not been hacked, but the user credentials of a sovereign account at UserTrust were leaked. The scandal is not the hack, but that these accounts even exist and are allowed to generate certificates at will.

An unknown entity just tried to gain the same level of arbitrary access to the CA system, that western states already have. Amazing research, fascinating article. Thank you for your work on this issue and on Tor in general. I have some contacts with human rights activists working in Iran. What kind of precautions do they need to take in light of the possibility that the attack originated from the state?

It's very hard to target every gmail user if you're not trying to connect to gmail. I notice more and more certificates are getting added and updated all the time. Is there a better and more secure and safe way than certificates or can more safeguards be applied to help keep certificates safe. If Iran did indeed have dealings in this then we must in carefully analyze the information and discover how to better safeguard and protect certificates to prevent man in the middle attacks from happening.

Furthermore, what other safeguards besides obvious ones like passwords, biometrics, secure limited access, need to know data, etc. We still need more and better ideas and soon. Thank you. So how come security. I don't produce the TBB. I've argued internally that we should enable this flag and this build fixes the immediate compromise problems at hand. How about disabling entirely so as not to notify third parties that the site in question is being accessed?

I don't have time to write one but it does seem like a reasonable compromise for hard failure modes and privacy concerns. Don't trust CAs that you do not actually know. Who is Comodo? I don't know anyone there, hence I don't trust them. Same goes for all the others, I just live without any CAs on my "trusted browser".

I trust my friends CAs, I trust my bank and other services certificates because I manually verify them. For the non important stuff, I take the risk of reading an altered blog post or use my "non trusted browser". They include in the subject:. Their websites have also done a disappearing act. I wonder if this goes some way to explaining the strange "global trustee" certificate.

The extent of the problem is surely a matter of whether the signing key was obtained or not. If the attackers obtained that, then revoking the certs issued on the CA's computer are almost immaterial as the attacker can continue issuing certs on their own computer. Gah, this is such a mess. Google's ones : ecbe9fca55f7bd09eae36e10cae1e d8f35f4ebb2dabefb0 b0bedf9b56fae91cbd3ac0 df40dae1f23f43 dfdaf5fbbba3 f5c86aff13a64f54f6dcc Mozilla's ones : df40dae1f23f43 00d8f35f4ebb2dabefb0 c50cd8eaefee8b0 00b0bedf9b56fae91cbd3ac0 00ebedc1aa2b 00dfdaf5fbbba3 ecbe9fca55f7bd09eae36e10cae1e 00f5c86aff13a64f54f6dcc06 af0e07df1f8aade34e0c 3e75ced46bae86a82a Every hash in the Google list are found in the Mozilla list : just a matter of visual representation.

Revocation date of 9 certificates are the followings. I don't understand sth. Why has the industry chosen to 'ignore' returned errors on the crl queries? Are there a lot of false positives? And is it i. It's easy to guess why : end user experience! Joe User wants to get to that site and could care less about faked certs. Browser vendors chose to give access anyway rather than risk the user blame browser.

This is going to be a long post, but there are a number of things that are relevant to the discussion and some things I just want to get off my chest yet some details I can't disclose, not for loyalty to an entity but for fear of that entity knowing my identity. Some of this is in response to comments, of which there are too many to quote. Some have been mentioned in the article, so I will just add onto the list.

First big problem is the typing of encryption and authentication. The fact that I can't encrypt any content without a cert is a major problem. Sure you can use a self-signed cert, or make your own CA, but that causes browsers to throw a fit and is a bad user experience. You can add your cert to the trusted list, but that doesn't scale. Some will argue that encryption is worthless without trust, but I disagree. Rather, it goes the other way. If I need to trust the other party, then surely I want privacy encryption , but just because I want privacy doesn't mean I have to trust the other party.

There are a variety of reasons to want to encrypt more traffic with sites which are fairly anonymous. Many more services would offer an encrypted version without validation if the two were not tied. Alas, currently it is infeasible to do so without spending some cash on a cert, and the reality is that many free projects simply don't have that money to spend or would rather not fund corrupt CAs for ideological reasons.

Some have stated that there's only validation in EV. That is wrong in principle, EV is extended validation, meaning it extended the validation of standard certs, not that there is none. The entire basis of the certificate is that is proves who you are and to do that there must be validation.

Unfortunately, that validation by the commercial CAs is very weak. They actually turned this weakness into part of the marketing of EV certs to organizations that can afford it, but the only real step it adds is necessity of forking over thousands of dollars which, which increasing profits massively, really only stops the casual attacks wherein people obtain certs to show how bad the CAs are e. The CAs are business whose sole purpose is to make money.

They say we should trust them, but why? They put the minimal effort into verification because that costs money, reducing profits. They allow resellers with lax rules because more certificates sold means more income, and more stringent checks means fewer certs sold. These companies do not have out security interests in mind, and we know we cannot trusty them, so why do we continue to trust them?

Just as I don't trust them to check identity, I don't trust them to protect their keys, to disclose breaches, or to correctly identify the source of problems. I notice I;m not the only one who thinks naming Iran is a little too convenient. I'm actually somewhat surprised they didn't name Libya as part of the crusade to justify yet another war.

The browser vendors also cannot be trusted. They put as many CAs in their root list as possible to make a better user experience. All of them put the most users as top priority, and anything that harms the user experience for the average non-techie user is seen as a negative.

That is both why they have the default to allow on failure conditions, as well as every CA they can come up with in root list. Worse, the browsers tend to use a union of their list and the OS list. Take a quick look through, and not only will you find the names we know like VeriSign and Comodo, but others that frankly have no reason to be there. How many are surprised to see a CA from China in their list? Some time ago I interviewed with a certain fruity company for a security manager position and the question came up of who are you trusting when you see the lock icon in your browser.

They wanted an answer along the lines of trusting the site, the CA, and everyone in the chain between them involved in issuing the cert. My answer was also the browser vendor, the OS vendor, and anyone who has access legitimate or not to add certificates to your root store. That and some other answers didn't help me land that job, but I didn't exactly want it either, I was just playing along because I was intrigued about the existence and purpose of the position as well as why they were calling me for it.

In a past phase of life, I worked on some projects for the US govt involving securing their communications in a mobile environment. Suffice to say that their requirements worked well to negate the effectiveness of their security. In part because certain things that should have been done were not, and in part because the overall combination of reqs made the user experience so bad that many are bound to actively work around it.

One thing they did right was they would not validate a cert without checking the CRL. One thing they did wrong was disallow CRL caching even brief , so the list had to be fetched every time, which is very slow over a public mobile phone network when its several megabytes.

By nature, the CRL only grows, it can never shrink. Another problem was no OCSP was allowed. Why would that be? Not because it had shortcomings, but it created a trail that could be audited, and while they were careful to include plenty of downward checks, there was careful avoidance of upward checks. This system is used both by ground troops and by command, extending up to the Chief Executive of the armed forces. Suffice to say, the higher ups don't always want the same scrutiny applied to their activities as they apply to those below.

And yes, it all runs on Windows, both the clients and servers, as well as proxies, only some critical routers use Linux because not much else could handle the role. As I was not a member of any part of the govt but an outside contractor, I did not have a.

Instead, I was directed to an ECA External Certificate Authority , which is a party that has been trusted to issue certificates expressly for the purpose of communicating with certain govt branches. If you have such a certificate, there is an assumption you have some business in sending emails to certain people and they are more likely to respond, so having one when you shouldn't could be abused. The process to get one was much like any other 'high security' certificate; fill out paperwork, include copies of ID low res black and white xerox , include letter of employment on company letterhead as if they know what that should look like , get it all notarized done by the company employed notary that stamps anything delivered to her desk , include payment and send it all off by regular post.

The one extra check the ECA does beyond their normal validation is to check if the company is on the list of those who have active projects and thus should be allowed to obtains certs for their employees. A couple weeks after I mailed off the application, I got a call on my office phone from someone at the ECA.

He said that everything checked out fine except that out company could not be found on the list from the DoD I hope they don't actually have the full list, but rather just query it and got back a no response. I told him "Well, we supply to the DoD and some some other departments, but the project which we are actually doing under contract for which I need this certificate originates from NSA, not DoD.

They never put anyone on the list. Its all a big secret over there. So if anyone with some social skills who wants to go phishing in the DoD, just remember the magic words "I"m with the NSA. In summary, we can't trust any vendors, not the CAs, not the browsers, not the commercial OSes. I think most of us knew that, but for those who didn't, I hope I laid out some convincing points. There are some other bits that bring perspective.

We knew the CAs bend for the govt, but the CAs that work in direct cooperation with the govt don't even do a reasonable job in that role. For their role with regular clients, can we expect them to anything other than a worse job? The incompetence of the govt also comes into light, but it shouldn't be news considering the leaks. I think what will be news for some is how easily someone so low on the chain could exploit their weaknesses.

And once you are in, you are IN. There is NO security once you breach the perimeter So, where do we go from here? I already have separate trusted and untrusted browser. I should have a trusted workspace with deeper separation, but Qubes has some ways.

There is no absolute security, but the closer you come, the less you can get done. I saw mention of some interesting things, such as peer trust model not quite the PGP web of trust to apply after distrusting CAs by default, which I will have to look into.

One thing I think we need is an open, trusted CRL aggregator to collect the CRLs from as many CAs as possible at minimum all those most are default to trust and make that available for local caching. Another necessity is a local OCSP run from that aggregate CRL to answer questions without leaving a trail outside the locally trusted network. A hosted version of that could be run by and open and trustworthy party as a convenience for those with less strict privacy requirements.

I can pull the CRLs myself and cache them locally, but a local OCSP would greatly simplify the process as currently it requires catching the CRL requests and doing so comprehensively is non-trivial. That is still just a stopgap to reduce the problem with CAs. First, we need encryption by default without regard to the partner. In the longer term, we need a replacement for CAs. The most obvious solution is a hybrid model. Further, sites could mark each other trusted, but that should not be the only source of trust.

The exact details of how to do this greatly overlaps with a much longer running discussion started or continuing some months ago with serious discussion about the future of DNS following the abuses of the US govt. I would not be surprised to see the govt abusing root CAs with greater ease than they have abused DNS recently.

Notice that they don't even have to use a commercial CA to forge any site, if you use a commercial OS you already have certs for govt owned CAs in your roots. Not really. Likewise, what are the privacy issues with using the Firefox Add-on Perspectives with Tor? Lastly, what is the word on OCSP stapling? Can it be used with Firefox and Tor? Interestingly, today, , the Certificate Patrol plugin in my browser noticed that Google replaced at least one of its certificates out of schedule.

Normally, certificates are replaced a short time before they expire, for example a few weeks before. This replacement happened about a year before expiration, about two weeks after the previous update, so it appears to have been replaced out of schedule. To me, it appears that the old and new certificates essentially differ in the public keys contained in the certificates. Other differences such as the serial number are to be expected. That private key was replaced. Together with the certificate itself which is public , it can be used to impersonate servers in the domain in question gstatic.

Maybe it was in danger of not being private any more? The old cert's SHA1 fingerprint was: fed2:e8:eae:ff:ff:fa:cf Subject Key Identifier: fc:a9:b8:d6:e2:c7:cdffef The new cert's SHA1 is: cbf5:f4:eabd:5fdd:aed Subject Key Identifier: ece:7f:2f:daeabcb5. And another replacement, encountered at apis. Yet another replacement, encountered at ssl. In this case, the old certificate was stored by Certificate Patrol on ,before the new certificate was issued, as is to be expected.

Thank you four your nice writing on Detecting Certificate Authority compromises and web browser collusion. In this revision, the developers added XCertificate::IsBlacklisted, which returns true if a HTTPS certificate has one of these particular serial numbers: ecbe9fca55f7bd09eae36e10cae1e d8f35f4ebb2dabefb0 b0bedf9b56fae91cbd3ac0 df40dae1f23f43 dfdaf5fbbba3 f5c86aff13a64f54f6dcc06 A comment marks the first as "Not a real certificate. Mozilla pushed out two patches of interest: rev-feef revf The complete changeset is semi-informative.

However, the serial numbers from the Mozilla patches are different: df40dae1f23f43 00d8f35f4ebb2dabefb0 c50cd8eaefee8b0 00b0bedf9b56fae91cbd3ac0 00ebedc1aa2b 00dfdaf5fbbba3 ecbe9fca55f7bd09eae36e10cae1e 00f5c86aff13a64f54f6dcc06 af0e07df1f8aade34e0c 3e75ced46bae86a82a71 Thus, both Mozilla and Google shipped similar patches to their code at roughly the same time.

Looking for df40dae1f23f43 in parsed CRLs Looking for 00b0bedf9b56fae91cbd3ac0 in parsed CRLs Looking for 00dfdaf5fbbba3 in parsed CRLs Looking for 00d8f35f4ebb2dabefb0 in parsed CRLs Looking for 00ebedc1aa2b in parsed CRLs Looking for 00f5c86aff13a64f54f6dcc06 in parsed CRLs Looking for ecbe9fca55f7bd09eae36e10cae1e in parsed CRLs Looking for af0e07df1f8aade34e0c in parsed CRLs Looking for 3e75ced46bae86a82a71 in parsed CRLs Looking for c50cd8eaefee8b0 in parsed CRLs Looking for b0bedf9b56fae91cbd3ac0 in parsed CRLs Looking for dfdaf5fbbba3 in parsed CRLs Looking for d8f35f4ebb2dabefb0 in parsed CRLs Looking for f5c86aff13a64f54f6dcc06 in parsed CRLs Looking for ebedc1aa2b in parsed CRLs Comments Please note that the comment area below has been archived.

Comodo has announced. The verification process for. Why do you think it's even. Encryption is useless. I think a lot of people. TLS is for making a. CAs have used the "we must. You'd do well to research a. This, in combination with. Comodo was also the company.

Did you inform anyone else affiliated with The Tor Project, Inc. I'm sorry that I agreed to. I'm sorry that I agreed to the embargo at all at this point. To reply your your. To reply your your questions: 1 They expressed concerns about being able to ship a fix to Firefox - that is a brand new Firefox binary with hardcoded serials in their blocklist. I thank you for your work in.

It's funny how when I. Worse, EFF uses wildcard. Worse, EFF uses wildcard certificate. SSL has always been for both. This is obviously a. Disconnect now, or be subject to their whims and wrath. I've said too much for the black helicopters approach. I'm guessing you're british. How about them conspiracies?

He's joking 2. Which government do you think the NSA is in, exactly? There is already an implicit. Just get something working, it has to be better than this. Otherwise, good article. In other words, these concerns are largely moot. When Certstar got caught. What about phobos'. Can we at least start. Too many questions. Seems like. Yes we could do with a. CAs are dead Long live, hmmm bastion hosts. Shouldn't the browsers be. Microsoft's response:. A source at Microsoft says.

It's not necessarily. Update: Comodo has published. Does anyone know what's. Does anyone know what's Safari's status is with blacklisting revoked certificates? I share your concern about. Send them another Christmas. Send them another Christmas present for their efforts. Microsoft update regarding. Does the SSL Observatory.

Does the SSL Observatory have any legit certs with global trustee in the cn or san fields? I asked Seth from the EFF. They're still missing a few. They're still missing a few serious points. I may be completely wrong. The HTTP trick does that.

The HTTP trick does that without any crypto trickery. There are some relevant. I've marked all my CAs as. Went to upgrade FF, upgrade. It fails if it does not get a response. Checked the IP where I was getting errors. Other errors, Facebook. Read the Freedom To Tinker post, aha.

Read this post, aha. Report of incident on. If it was an attack by. I propose a very different. One day great. Hey, you still getting molested at the airport Jacob? In a perfect world people. In this brave new world they only get harassed in US airports. Jake, in your update you.

Jake, in your update you have harsh words for Comodo. This is surely justified. Yet your own company, Tor, is hardly a sterling example of protecting its users. Yet it was last updated April 19, -- nearly a year ago! I think you're mistaken and. I think you're mistaken and I've pointed Mike at your comment.

He'll address them shortly. You seem to misunderstand. The 'global trustee' cert. Lots of talk about Mozilla,. Great post. I have a. I wonder why if the lead. It's a certificate encoding.

Comodo browser fiasco download nero 10 full crack vn zoom

CYBERDUCK APPLESCRIPT EXAMPLES

Веб магазин косметики, 400 грн Время 304-35-75 Товаров в корзине: 0 На. Веб магазин косметики. Brasmatic 063 30-43-575 тестера косметики, пробники работы Интернет-магазин работает с пн сумму: 00,00 грн.

Root certificates therefore often have long lifetimes, typically 10 or 20 years, and the assumption is that everyone will have plenty of time to stop relying on old root certificates long before they expire. Ironically, then, the newer and fresher your chain of trust, the less reliable your certificates will seem to old-timer programs out there. When the tired old root certificate expires, software that has never heard of the all-new root certificate that replaced it will simply stop working.

You can follow the old-style intermediate certificate to the now-expired root certificate, or you can try the other way home, validating with the new-style intermediate and correctly determining that it is signed by a new and valid root. Ideally, newer certificates should trump older ones, so that as long as one of the certificate chains checks out, the leaf certificate should be accepted.

But, as Ayer explains, some older TLS software or some older versions of current TLS libraries fail if the first certificate chain they try has expired, even though trying again with fresher data would find that the HTTPS connection was valid. If you are getting web connection errors on software that was working fine until the end of last month, where the error lists an invalid certificate called AddTrust External CA Root , you need to take action. The expired certificate was replaced a decade ago!

Click-and-drag on the soundwaves below to skip to any point in the podcast. You can also listen directly on Soundcloud. Follow NakedSecurity on Twitter for the latest computer security news. And the same question for the independent browsers like Firefox and Silk?

This was perfectly timed. It solved a support ticket that was opened moments before this article arrived in my inbox. Keep up the great work! The Sophos XG had this problem — had to add in the current root certificate manually to fix a load of certificate expired error pages our users were getting.

This was happening up until either april or yesterday, depending on whether you got one from a comodo or sectigo root CA. So for instance, I had to fix the bundle file on certs bought as recently as December for my customers. When you buy the cert, they give you the. In these versions, the bug where OpenSSL fails right away instead of trying to cross sign happens. Debian and Ubuntu are both rushing to ship a new ca-certificates package that does not have that expired AddTrust.

Now I understand why we started getting weird errors in our web backend on the weekend. Deleting the expired intermediate from the hosting end should cause any modern and capable system that was still throwing errors to start working again. The big issue here. Telling everyone.. Yeah maybe they were doing it wrong… But this could have easily been avoided if I deleted the intermediate before it expired.

A big long support page explaining cross signing is also not helpful. What would have been helpful would have been short, direct, easy to follow steps you can take to resolve the issue. They should have stopped issuing cross signed certs to an expiring CA 2 years ago so nobody was affected at all. I never received an email telling me about this. So I was blindsided. Great article. Could you please pass this on to the team responsible for the Sophos UTM product so they can fix it.

Should the client go out of its way to find an alternative but still-valid chain from the leaf to a valid root? Or should it validate the chain supplied by the server, as supplied by the server? Thanks Paul, the issue for us was that the Sophos UTM web filter would block access to some websites using affected certificates claiming that the certificate had expired, however if we took the web filter out of the equation and accessed those websites directly then they were accessible without issue.

I wasted a few hours the other day trying to work out what the issue was. A customer purchased the certificate in the first place and asked me to install it last month. Then over the weekend our monitoring system started raising alarms about cert chain errors — at first I thought someone is mucking about with the certs or the server has been compromised.

The library should default to verify them and raise an exception when could not found the path to the root certificates. The internet is so broken exactly because this type of complacency with bad defaults in pretty much any software we use, like databases, aka MySql, ElasticSearch, MongoDB, etc. Until this mindset changes the Internet will continue broken, and data-breaches will be a common thing in the day life of each citizen with an online presence.

I already answered your question and I have not changed my view. The fact that it is possible to use a programming library insecurely does not, in my opinion, constitute a CVE-level security vulnerability in that library. Otherwise, every use-after-free bug that ever happened would surely have to be considered a CVE in the heap manager, not in the code that incorrectly used the heap, and that is not generally how CVEs are assigned.

By your argument, namely that all security-related options should be on my default, you would surely expect Erlang to force certificate validation in its server code, too — i. Sorry Paul, my simple brain started to overload half-way down this article.

So this is an end-user problem, not a website problem? The end user has to delete the AddTrust External CA Root certificate from their computer, not the website that is serving the content? Thanks Richard. Google released a proof of concept exploit, less than 10 lines of JavaScript code, that lists the data of a stolen cookie in a JavaScript popup in the browser. It is quite frightening that security companies such as Comodo, AVG or TrendMicro have created products in the past that put users at risk despite claims by these companies that their products improve user privacy and security while on the Internet.

The companies in question fixed the detected issues or are in the process of fixing them, but the underlying implication is more severe than the detected security issue considering that this should not happen to security companies in first place. I am using Cent Browser, I am very satisfied! DNS Hijacking?? The fixes are ready for Comodo browsers and they will be released soon..

I hate Google every single day.. They mislead users with fake concerns.. Disabling the same origin policy is not acceptable but others are fake lamentations.. Same with Waterfox when the developer declares he improved this, removed that, and the result being a problematic browser.

You have to be an expert such as the developer of Pale Moon browser to know exactly what you are doing. Obviously Comodo lacks. Security is definitely a huge issue. It seems we cannot trust anything these days in terms of our browsers or even the computers that we buy.

After all, how many companies have gotten in trouble for installing software on new computers that are basically showcasing everything we do online? Security is a long-term project or huge system to maintain. Everyone or every firm has its own advantages and weaknesses. Now that with Windows 8 and above they can collect every bit of personal data of what you do online or even offline and have it sent back to them and from that, sell it off to companies, means that nothing is safe anymore!

For those who try to remove this spyware from their computer, they have only found out that it magically reinstall itself. Did people really think that Microsoft was actually going to just give away Windows 10 and not make a profit from it?! It is also the one reason I no longer update my Windows 7 machine because I know that at least 1 of those updates will try and stick me into windows It is just Plain upsetting that an American company like Microsoft can get away with something like this in a day like this when privacy issues are a big concern to people.

Of course Microsoft claims that it will never give out personal information like you banking or credit card info. Only problem is that the software they use has recently been found to be easily hackable and others can now break into it and steal that same stuff that Microsoft is stealing from its customers. Will be nice to have an overview of open source and truly freeware options on that front. New Chromodo version just released which fixed the problem above.

Same origin policy problem fixed. Shame on you Google, this bug reports should be private for 90 days. They even did not obey their own rules. Because Comodo released a adblocker for all platforms.. Google is an ad company. They did not like these adblockers you know ;. Now the extension completeyly removed from Comodo browsers. That was very serious, and to quote infoworld. Save my name, email, and website in this browser for the next time I comment.

Please click on the following link to open the newsletter signup page: Ghacks Newsletter Sign up. Ghacks is a technology news blog that was founded in by Martin Brinkmann. It has since then become one of the most popular tech news sites on the Internet with five authors and regular contributions from freelance writers.

Search for:. Martin Brinkmann. Chromodo Browser has serious security issues. Related content Hundreds of HP printers affected by critical security issues.

Comodo browser fiasco tightvnc file transfer linux to linux

The Rise and Fall of Netscape - The Browser That Once Ruled Them All (A Retrospective)

Theme simply how to download recorded zoom video assured, what

Следующая статья use filezilla

Другие материалы по теме

  • Comodo error 2229
  • 1966 ford thunderbird sale
  • Citrix delivery controller logs
  • Mysql workbench 64 download
  • 2 комментариев